Which of these four instruments offers the greatest protection against a decision of refoulement from a European country? The answer to this question is far from being academic. The rule that an international organ may only be competent to consider an individual petition or communication provided "the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of individual investigation or settlement" is embodied in all three instruments providing a procedure for individual complaints. It is therefore crucial for an asylum-seeker to give his or her best shot first, even if, as rightly pointed out by Liz Heffernan, the Strasbourg organs and the Geneva organs are not in competition. 1 This article will review the scope of protection afforded under the three of these treaties which provide an international enforcement mechanism to persons who have sought refugee status in the domestic jurisdiction.
Refoulement describes the act of returning a person to a country where he or she fears for his or her life or freedom on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The principle of non-refoulement is part of the right (not) to return recognised to everyone by international law. In situations where an individual is unwilling to return, States' authorities must verify that no obstacles exist to the return of the individual to his or her country of origin 
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The system of protection offered by the Refugee Convention is distinct from that offered under the other three instruments which have an international enforcement mechanism for at least four reasons. First, it relies on the power of the judiciary in each member State to interpret the provisions of the Convention. Second, it is limited to persons recognised as refugees under the Convention (and the definition is restrictive) and to asylum-seekers who are awaiting a decision on their refugee status. 4 Third, it provides derogations to the principle of non-refoulement in time of war but also where the applicant has committed some serious crime. Fourth, it provides no mechanism of enforcement. In contrast, the European Convention offers considerable advantages over the Refugee Convention to persons not formally recognised as refugees against return to a country where they would fear for their security. Article 3 of the European Convention is absolute and unconditional. Moreover, it applies to everyone, even illegal entrants, whatever their activities or personal conduct. 5 The individual does not need to be a citizen of a contracting party, or need to be inside the territory of a contracting State. 6 Finally, the European Convention provides a mechanism of enforcement.
Thus, the European Convention appears to be more extensive in scope than the Refugee Convention, but is it the best one to offer protection against refoulement for asylum-seekers in particular? Indeed, if the recent On the basis of a comparative study of the key elements of the individual complaints procedures under the European Convention, the Torture Convention, and the Political Covenant, this article examines the practical advantages and disadvantages that each mechanism may offer to an asylum-seeker in Europe. 8 This article focuses on international proceedings. 9 It concludes that the most generous protection against refoulement from Europe lies in the development of the case law of the 7. On 1 Jan. 1998, the European Convention was binding on 39 European States, all of which had recognised the right of individual petition under Art.25 and the jurisdiction of the Court under Art.46. The Refugee Convention was binding on 131 States, including all the signatories to the European Convention with the exception of Andorra and San Marino. The Torture Convention was binding on 103 States, including all the signatories to the European Convention except four, i.e. Andorra, Belgium, Ireland and San Marino. Of these 35 States, Albania, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, the UK and Ukraine had not recognised the competence of the Torture Committee to receive individuals' complaints. The Political Covenant was binding on 140 States, including all the signatories to the European Convention, except three, i.e. Andorra, Liechtenstein and Turkey. Of these 36 States, Albania, Switzerland and the UK are not a party to the Optional Protocol.
8. Provisions relating to the right to life, unlawful detention, family life, education, ' freedom of association and expression, though relevant to the issue of expulsion of asylum-seekers, remain outside the scope of this article. For reasons of space, this article focuses exclusively on refoulement from Europe. The right to family life is explored in H. Finally, two points may be made about the timeliness of this article. In the last five years, the European Court of Human Rights has dealt with an increasing number of cases of expulsion under Article 3 of the European Convention. The result seems to be a more liberal jurisprudence. Previous conclusions on the subject need, therefore, to be revisited in the light of recent judgments and also of Protocol XI to the European Convention.
10 Similarly, more cases of refoulement, expulsion and deportation have come to the attention of the Geneva Committees. Hence, the need to concentrate on the findings of these Committees and to apply them to a specific contest, i.e. non-refoulement. u Taking the perspective of an asylum-seeker, this article addresses four questions to determine which instrument provides best protection from refoulement from Europe. Who is covered by the provisions relating to non-refoulementl What are the admissibility requirements? What kinds of ill-treatment in the country of destination may provide grounds for claiming protection from refoulementl And what are the evidentiary requirements? Before answering each of these questions in turn, the substantial provisions prohibiting torture as a means of preventing refoulement will be discussed.
II. SUBSTANTIAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING TORTURE AS MEANS OF PREVENTING REFOULEMENT FROM EUROPE
NON-REFOULEMENT is the principle upon which the system of legal protection of refugees rests. It has become a peremptory norm of international human rights law, as demonstrated by its endorsement in two UN instruments, the Refugee Convention (Article 33) and the Torture Convention (Article 3) . 12 Furthermore, Article 7 of the Political Covenant and Article 3 of the European Convention has been interpreted to encompass this prohibition.
11
In the language of protection, it does not really matter whether protection against refoulement is provided under the Refugee Convention or under principles of human rights law, so long as it is effective. Refugee law is often recognised to be part of human rights law. However, considerations on refoulement or torture, by the Geneva Committees or Strasbourg organs do not constitute a decision on refugee status. Thus, the distinction between the two systems of legal norms becomes important regarding the determination of refugee status because the Refugee Convention alone creates a status which is recognised in domestic law.
14 Refoulement refers to the expulsion, deportation, removal, extradition, sending back, return or rejection of a person from a country to the frontiers of a territory where there exists a danger of ill-treatment, i.e. persecution, torture or inhuman treatment. Of the four instruments, the Refugee Convention is the only one which does not provide an absolute and unconditional guarantee against refoulement. 15 Protection from refoulement under the Refugee Convention is limited on two grounds: danger to the security of the country in which the refugee is, or, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, a refugee constitutes a danger to the community of that country (Article 33(2)). In addition, Article IF excludes from the benefit of the whole Convention any person whom there are serious reasons for considering has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission to that country of refuge, or has been found guilty of 13. UNGA Res.2200 A (XXI) and E.T.S. No.5, respectively. Outside the scope of these provisions, the expulsion of a refugee lawfully in a territory is explicitly prohibited by Art.32 of the Refugee Convention and Art.13 of the Political Covenant. In addition, Art.4, Protocol 4 to the European Convention prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens. As for refugees unlawfully in a territory, they are covered by Art.31 of the Refugee Convention (as far as penalties, not including expulsion, are concerned) and ArtJ3 (as far as refoulement is concerned).
14. Bodies (1996) , p.47, n.68). McGoldriclc's assessment of the Human Rights Committee's work on Art.7, however, is highly critical. He describes the final views of the Committee as "often unhelpful, incomprehensible, or ambiguous" and goes as far as accusing the Committee of "arbitrariness in its findings". He notices the lack of co-operation between States, which persist in violating Art.7, and the Committee, and the lack of publicity of the Committee's views. He recognises that there is as yet no proof that States are following the Committee's recommendations. Finally, he concludes by stating that the views of the Committee "have only been of marginal significance in terms of effective human rights protection" (see McGoldrick, op. cit supra n.ll, at p.381).
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supervised by the Committee of Ministers. 26 Finally, two developments lead us to conclude that the gap between Strasbourg and Geneva is closing rather than deepening. First, the practice of States shows that the views of the Torture Committee are being complied with. 27 Second, a Special Rapporteur was appointed, in 1990, and a procedure created to follow up the views of the Human Rights Committee. 28 
III. WHO IS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO NON-REFO ULEMENT!
THE scope rationepersonae is considerably limited under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. In order to benefit from the principle of nonrefoulement, the person must be a refugee, or at least an asylum-seeker awaiting for a decision on refugee status. 29 The UNHCR defines "rejected asylum-seekers" as persons who are not in need of international protection but recognises the danger of this definition where too often persons who are refused the status of refugee remain nevertheless in need of protection. This is particularly the case, notes the UNHCR, of asylum-seekers rejected by application of the principle of "safe third country" or for reasons of national security. 30 In addition, recent instances reveal that the bad faith of any asylum-seeker has been used as evidence against the grant of refugee status by national authorities outside the scope of credible risk of persecution. 31 No such distinction between refugees or asylum-seekers awaiting a decision on their status and rejected asylum-seekers unlawfully in the country applies with regard to the other three instruments. Everyone is protected irrespective of conduct, nationality or citizenship under Article 3 of the European Convention, Article 3 of the Torture Convention and Article 7 of the Political Covenant. 32 The unconditional character of the prohibition of 26. Art.46 (old Arts.46 and 54), European Convention. This is not the case, however, for reports adopted by the Commission or decisions adopted by the Committee of Ministers where the case is not referred to the Court (old Art32).
27. See Andrysek, op. cit. supra n.ll, at pp.402-414. 30. EXCOM of the UNHCR, Standing Committee, 8th meeting, EC/47/SC/CRP.28, 5. Note also the emergence of the "Dublin principle" according to which the first "safe country" is no longer the EL) country an asylum-seeker reaches first, but the EU country in which he or she first applies for asylum (Art.7, Dublin Convention): (1997) refoulement or torture in these instruments has resulted in protecting rejected asylum-seekers, criminals, drug traffickers and even terrorists from removal. 31 
IV. WHAT ARE THE ADMISSIBILTTY REQUIREMENTS?
WHETHER under the Torture Convention, the Political covenant or the European Convention, specific requirements must be fulfilled for a petition to be declared admissible prior to its examination on the merits. Of the three instruments dealing with the subject, the Torture Committee offers the most liberal approach.
34 Admissibility is a difficult stage indeed to pass for asylum-seekers under the European Convention 35 and also, it would seem, under the Political Covenant. 36 The case law of the Human Rights Committee seems to reflect that of the Strasbourg organs, with one . In a number of cases, however, a friendly settlement was reached before the Commission adopted a decision on admissibility.
36. In comparison with the Torture Committee or the Strasbourg organs, the Human Rights Committee has dealt with very few expulsion cases. More specifically, it reached views only in cases of expulsion alleging a violation of Art.9 (detention), Art.13 (expulsion of an alien lawfully in the country) and Art. 14 (due process and fair trial); Maroufidou v. 38 In addition, all three instruments preclude the consideration of an application or a communication if the alleged violation is not covered by a provision of the instrument, or if it occurred before the entry into force of the instrument for the State party concerned, unless the alleged violations continue or have continuing effects which in themselves constitute a violation.
Article 35(1) (old Article 26) of the European Convention, in laying down an absolute time limit of six months for introducing complaints before the Commission, provides a further hurdle for applicants. 39 There is no such time limit before the Human Rights Committee or the Torture Committee following the exhaustion of local remedies. However, an extreme delay may be considered an abuse of the right of submission under Article 41(l)c of the Political Covenant. 40 37. The Refugee Convention is outside the scope of this section. Its operation depends upon the decision of the competent national authorities. A whole range of admissibility devices, of a jurisdictional and substantive nature, have been developed by European States in order to introduce a presumption of inadmissibility and justify the recourse to accelerated procedures in cases which do not satisfy these requirements. These "exception" cases include, in particular, "safe third country" cases, "manifestly unfounded" claims and "safe country of origin" cases. For instance, in the UK, out of 28,945 refused asylum applications in 1997 (excluding dependants), 6,161 were rejected outright on "safe third country" and "non-compliance" grounds (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics Untied Kingdom 1997, Issue 14/98, Table 1.3). 38. In Cruz Varas v. Sweden, supra n.23, the European Court found that the right of petition had been obstructed by an expulsion order being carried out.
39. This six-month period runs from "service of the written text of the judgment" (Worm v. Austria, Application No.22714/93).
40. The Torture Convention is silent on this point, and one may find that, by extrapolation, the same rule would apply.
B. The "Victim " Requirement and the Role of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) An individual (or individuals) petitioning the Strasbourg organs 41 or the Geneva Committees must be a "victim" of a violation by a State party to the relevant convention/covenant of the rights set forth in that instrument. In addition, anonymous complaints or communications will not be accepted. Under all three instruments, individual complaints may also be brought by indirect victims acting as legal representatives. It is nevertheless significant that, under the European Convention, the requirement that the petitioner be a victim of the alleged violation extends to all categories of petitioners, whether legal or natural persons, individuals or groups, or NGOs; a difficult requirement to meet in the case of NGOs in particular. This is not the case under the two other instruments.
42 Each instrument will now be considered in turn.
First, under old Article 25 (now Article 34) of the European Convention, "the Commission [now the Court] may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation". 41 In assessing the victim requirement, the Commission refers to all relevant facts particular to each case. Thus, in cases of expulsion of aliens, it relies on medical reports, the state of health of the "victim" and the existing conditions in the country where the "victim" and the existing conditions in the country where the "victim" is to be expelled. 44 Second, Article 22 of the Torture Convention explicitly provides for communications to be submitted not only by the individual alleged victim but also by relatives, designated representatives (e.g. NGOs) or "others on behalf of an alleged victim when it appears that the victim is unable to submit the communication himself, and the author of the communication justifies his acting on the victim's behalf". It is for the third party to establish with sufficient proof his or her authority to act on 41. Before 1 Nov. 1998, an individual, a group of individuals or NGOs could only bring a case to the Court if they had lodged a complaint to the Commission, if the respondent State had ratified Protocol IX of the European Convention, and if their case had been screened by a special panel (Protocol IX, Art.5). Under Protocol XI, all applicants have direct access to the new Court.
42. The presence of the UNHCR (i.e. an IGO) in Strasbourg demonstrates the pressing need in having the Strasbourg organs working closer with the UNHCR but also with NGOs. Their involvement in the European system of protection of human rights should be of great value considering their experience in human rights protection.
43. The applicant must show that he or she runs the risk of being affected by the law. behalf of the victim. 45 Finally, under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant, the Human Rights Committee is competent "to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party". The jurisprudence of the Committee shows that "for a person to claim to be victim of a violation of a right protected by the Covenant, he or she must show either that an act or omission of a State party has already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an effect is imminent". 46 This concept was somewhat expanded in Kindler v. Canada to encompass situations where there is "a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction".' 47 Provisions of the Political Covenant do not allow for other persons, e.g. NGOs or relatives, to take a case to the Committee, except in rare instances where it is possible to consider the relative as an indirect victim. 48 In addition, the Rules of Procedures of the Human Rights Committee allow for two exceptions: the alleged victim appoints a representative or the alleged victim is unable to submit the communication personally and a third party, e.g. an NGO, is authorised to do it.
49

C. The Claim Must not be Abusive and there Must Be a Prima Facie Case
Applications or communications need to be sufficiently clear to avoid being found abusive and they must provide a minimum amount of information, in other words be sufficiently substantiated. The European Convention is restrictive on this point, with Article 35(3) (old Article 27) referring to the concept of "manifestly ill-founded" petitions in addition to "an abuse of the right of application". This is not the case with the Torture Convention (Article 22) or the Political Covenant (Article 3, Optional Protocol) which speak only of "an abuse of the right of 45. For instance, inM'Bv. Tunisia (UN Doc. A/50/44, Annex V), the Committee declared inadmissible a communication brought by a person on behalf of a dead victim on the ground that this third party was unable to provide "sufficient proof to establish his authority to act on behalf of the victim".
46 52. In D. v. United Kingdom, supra n.5, at para.48, the E.Ct.H.R. explained that even if the applicant never entered the UK in the technical sense, he had been within the jurisdiction of the UK, in custody, at Gatwick airport. Thus, for the Court, it was sufficient that "he had been physically present there".
53. Supra n. 
E. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies has long been accepted in customary international law. 57 In all three instruments under review, the alleged victim must show that all domestic remedies have been exhausted. 58 More specifically, the Torture Convention and the Political Covenant (Optional Protocol) speak only of domestic remedies which are available and recognise that this includes situations where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. 59 In addition, the Torture Convention requires that the remedy be one likely to bring effective relief.
Although similar criteria (i.e. availability, not unreasonably prolonged, and likely to bring effective redress) are being used by the Strasbourg and Geneva organs to decide on this requirement, they are applied more restrictively by the European Commission than by the two Committees. And, indeed, many cases brought to the Commission are declared inadmissible on the grounds that domestic law provides an effective remedy. 60 For instance, in cases of deportation or expulsion to a country where the applicant would be faced with a life-threatening sentence, the European Commission, while recognising that a remedy needs to have suspensive effect in order to be effective, failed to take into account the special circumstances (i.e. the gravity of the treatment) and to assess the possibility of access to such remedy by the applicant. 61 More specifically, in cases involving asylum-seekers, the Commission considers that all domestic remedies under Article 35(1) (old Article 26) have not been exhausted where the "victim" did not request political asylum, or did not lodge an appeal against the decision of the State not to grant refugee status or against the decision of expulsion. The application will thus be declared inadmissible under Article 35(4) (old Article 27(3)) of the Convention. 62 show a more liberal application of these criteria. Inadmissibility on this ground seems to be declared only in quite clear-cut cases. 63 For instance, the Torture Committee considered the "new application" remedy (in the context of an application for refugee status in Sweden) as ineffective where a domestic authority was not given the opportunity to evaluate the new evidence submitted by the author before the Committee could examine the communication. 64 In another instance, the Torture Committee declared the communication inadmissible on the grounds that the expulsion order was still subject to an appeal and that no circumstances had been invoked showing that this remedy would be unlikely to bring effective relief. Indeed, the facts of the case showed that the appeal was pending and that a second expulsion order had already been quashed. 65 The plea of "special circumstances" is therefore accepted by the Torture Committee; rarely so by the Strasbourg organs. 66 The case law of the Human Rights Committee seems to suggest that such plea is accepted; 67 however, Nowak points out that its case law on deportation to a country of persecution where the remedy is without suspensive effect seems rather vague. ). In this case, the European Commission unanimously interpreted broadly the plea of "special circumstances" in order to absolve the applicant from exhausting domestic remedies at his disposal (13 Sept. 19%). The Court adopted a more restrictive view, ruling (19 Feb. 1998, supra, n.35) that it would not consider the merits of the case because local remedies had not been exhausted (the applicant had failed to convince the Court that failure to submit grounds of appeal within the time limit was due to the unavailability of documentary evidence). This "excessive formalism" was strongly criticised by some of the dissenting judges as potentially undermining the absolute character of the prohibition provided in Art. 69 In contrast, Article 5(2)a of the first Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant merely requires that "the same matter is not examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement", thus ruling out only the simultaneous examination of the same concrete, individual case submitted by the same individual, or by a third party but with his or her knowledge. 70 However, the effect of reservations entered by most member States of the Council of Europe has brought Article 5(2) of the Political Covenant (Optional Protocol) to read like Article 22(5)a of the Torture Convention, thereby preventing any potential competition between procedures before the European Commission and procedures before the Human Rights Committee. 71 Under all three instruments, non-conventional procedures such as those under the Human Rights Commission and its special rapporteurs are excluded from the scope of these provisions.
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F. No Similar Complaint is Being Considered (or Has Been Considered) by Another International Institution
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G. Interim Measures of Protection
On average, a case which is found to be admissible can take from two and a half to four years to be decided upon by the Human Rights Committee, and two years in the case of the Torture Committee, except where the Committee may decide a case within a few months on grounds of emergency. 73 The sophisticated, and complex, character of the European Convention supervisory system has resulted in cases taking, on average, between five and six years for a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. This does not take into account the initial delay of sometimes up to 18 months for the European Commission to consider an application due to a backlog. 74 This time element, coupled with the fact that, in cases involving "rejected asylum-seekers", an order of expulsion or deportation is usually imminent, gives to the issue of interim measures a certain urgency. Interim measures of protection against a deportation, expulsion 69 or extradition order may be indicated under the Rules of Procedures of the European Commission (rule 39, old rule 36), the Human Rights Committee (rule 86), and the Torture Committee (rule 108(9)). 75 Since neither the Commission nor the Committees sit on a permanent basis, interim measures are usually considered by the President of the Commission and, in the case of the two Committees, by a special rapporteur. Under all three instruments, interim measures of protection may be granted only in cases where an asylum-seeker can show that "irreparable" or "irretrievable" damage would occur if he or she was expelled prior to the European Commission, the Torture Committee or the Human Rights Committee taking a decision on the admissibility or on the merits of a complaint. The rules are clearly designed to deal with emergency situations. The "irreparable" or "irretrievable" character of the damage is a difficult element to prove, particularly before the European Commission, because the Commission requires a certain degree of probability (i.e. factual or material evidence) that the applicant will risk being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to his or her country of origin before the Commission can decide on the case. 76 European Convention expressly provides for the award of "just satisfaction to the injured party". Though awards are on restrictive grounds, it remains an attractive option for applicants. 81 The practice of the Human Rights Committee shows that compensation is often suggested and accepted to be paid by States, despite the non-binding nature of such payment.
V. WHAT KINDS OF ILL-TREATMENT MAY PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR NON-REFO ULEMENT1
THE treatment which must be prevented varies between threats to the refugee's life or freedom (Article 33, Refugee Convention), torture (Article 3, Torture Convention), torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3, European Convention), and torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7, Political Covenant). Of these four instruments, the European Convention, as interpreted by its organs, is the most liberal on the issue of the particular treatment which must be prevented.
As a result of a restrictive interpretation of the definition of a refugee under the Refugee Convention, 83 protection against refoulement is increasingly becoming a matter of policy consideration and of government discretion. 84 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, 85 through a wide interpretation of the words "inhuman or degrading treatment", have allowed anyone, includ-81. Mansi, supra n.78. Nevertheless in Ahmed (supra n.14) the Court ruled that Ahmed's repatriation would constitute a violation of Art.3 but denied his request for financial compensation on the ground that the judgment constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In view of the fact that Ahmed was refused a residence permit and denied the right to work, and as a result committed suicide, this raises the difficult issue of "just satisfaction" in the context of degrading treatment following a successful application on the ground of Art.3, an issue that the Court has not yet been willing to address.
82. Bautista v. Columbia, Communication No.563/1993, paras.8.6 and 10. See Heffernan, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.110.
83. The words "where his life or freedom would be threatened" are considered to have the same meaning as "well-founded fear of persecution" in Art.lA(2) of the Refugee Convention. See P. Weis (Ed.), The Refugee Convention, 1951 (1995), p.341.
84. Many rejected applicants for the status of refugee are allowed to remain at least temporarily. For instance, in 1997, out of 36,045 first-instance decisions taken in the UK (excluding dependants), 3,985 (11%) recognised refugee status, 3,115 (9%) did not recognise refugee status but granted exceptional leave to remain and 28,945 (80%) refused asylum and exceptional leave. In addition, the British government has allowed groups of people to remain on an exceptional basis, without applying for asylum (e.g. former Yugoslavs). Home Office Statistical Bulletin, op. cit. supra nSI, at Table 1.2 and  explanatory note 13. 85. The practice of the Human Rights Committee, although resembling that of the European Court on which it is based, seems, however, less consistent. See McGoldrick, op. cit supra n.ll, at pp.368-371.
ing rejected asylum-seekers, to seek protection against refoulement. 86 However, the views of the Human Rights Committee lack reasoning, creating therefore undesirable uncertainty for authors of a complaint. 87 More particularly, the Strasbourg organs recognise the application of Article 3 from the cumulative effect of ill-treatment, which if taken individually would not reach the threshold of severity required by Article 3.^ As regards the Torture Committee, it is restricted by the scope of the provisions of the Convention: non-refoulement is limited to torture and does riot extend to less serious ill-treatments. 89 The three elements of intent and intensity of the pain, source of the act, and purpose, thus, constitute a stringent requirement for activating protection.
90 This is not the case under the Political Covenant or European Convention, where one or more of these elements may be lacking." The distinction between torture and other treatments not amounting to torture is therefore crucial under the Torture Convention. 92 A further, and perhaps even more important, drawback is that the Torture Convention does not outlaw "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions". 91 On this account, uncertainties remain as to whether the 86. In terms of protection against ill-treatment in the event of an expulsion, it does not really matter whether Art.3 (European Convention) or Art.7 (Political Covenant) applies on the basis of torture or degrading treatment, except perhaps that the Court or Committee will be more sympathetic towards a case where torture or death is at stake. Outside expulsion cases, the difference between torture and degrading treatment is mainly relevant for the E.Ct.H.R. in matters of compensation because the treatment has already occurred.
87. As observed by Nowak, op. cit. supra n.ll, at p.135, the Human Rights Committee does not usually differentiate between categories of treatment and prefers referring to wider terms such as "severe treatment" or "ill-treatment", a satisfactory solution in practice as long as the treatment falls into the scope of Art.7.
88. Ahmed, supra n.14, H.L.R. v. 91. The attitude of the European Court, however, lacks consistency on this matter. In Ireland v. United Kingdom (supra n.18), it seemed to suggest that the suffering needs to be caused intentionally and for a purpose in order to be regarded as torture, but not with regard to other ill-treatment, whereas, in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom (28 May 1985, Ser. A, No.94) intent seemed to be necessary in order to have degrading treatment.
92. There are as yet no views on this issue and one hopes that the Torture Committee will not follow the precedent set by the E.Ct.H.R. in Ireland v. United Kingdom. See Suntinger, op. cU. supra n.10, at section IV.
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Convention establishes a common notion of lawful sanction or as to whether one should refer to the domestic legal system of each State. 94 Finally, there is the question of the incidence of the source of the ill-treatment on the success of an application for protection against refoulement. Under the Refugee Convention, the reference to "is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" in Article 1 A(2), has led many contracting parties to recognise refugee status only to applicants who fear persecution by State agents or, when persecution is feared from non-State agents, only where the State is unwilling to provide protection.
95 This is not the position of the UNHCR, who does not distinguish between State and non-State agents of persecution where the State is unwilling but also unable to provide protection. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee and the Strasbourg organs do not consider the source of the risk of ill-treatment to be relevant. The Human Rights Committee nevertheless requires that the conduct be imputable to the State, 96 an element no longer required by the European Court of Human 94. Voyame (op. cit supra n.89, at p.46), in particular, refers to certain practices (e.g. sexual mutilation and prolonged detention) rooted in the law of countries and raises the question of their legality under the Convention. He concludes by recognising the delicate character of the matter and by acknowledging that the Committee will have to deal with this. He also highlights problems related to customs and religions, to the country's lack of resources resulting in an emphasis on services such as education or health to the detriment of other sectors, e.g. prisons. The recent case of P.L.Q. v. Canada (supra n.14) nevertheless suggests that the Torture Committee chose to refer to the domestic legal system of the state in question. Rights since H.L.R. v. France.™ As for the Torture Convention, it is clear and restrictive on the matter. According to Article 1(1), there must be an act of public officials (i.e. the pain or suffering must "be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity") 98 
VI. WHAT ARE THE EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS?
STANDARD of proof, method of assessment of evidence, and decisive factors (i.e. particular circumstances) in the determination process of a legal claim are key elements in the appraisal of the effectiveness of a system offering to protect legal rights. The Refugee Convention does not deal with these requirements but the UNHCR guidelines require that "good reasons" be shown by the applicant that his or her fear be of "a reasonable degree" and that the applicant be given the benefit of the doubt." Contracting parties to the Refugee Convention are nevertheless free to determine their own criteria in deciding who is a refugee, including the appropriate standard of proof. Some States are clearly more restrictive than others in assessing the well-foundedness of the fear of persecution. However, it is generally accepted that where no conclusive evidence on the facts exist to back up a bona fide request for refugee status, the applicant be nevertheless granted protection against refoulement. The Strasbourg and Geneva organs apply a higher standard of proof than that set by the UNHCR. An asylum-seeker must indeed show two things: first, the existence of "substantial grounds" (for believing that, in the event of expulsion, he or she would face ill-treatment); 100 second, the existence of a "real risk" (that, in the event of expulsion, he or she, personally, is expected to face ill-treatment).
101 More specifically, the 97. In both Soering (supra n.6) and Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom (30 Oct. 1991, Ser. A, No.215), the Court required that certain conditions be met. In Chahal (supra n.3), risk of ill-treatment was not coming from the State but from other factions. In Ahmed (supra n.14), the Court, by recognising a violation of Art.3 in spite of the lack of State authority in Somalia, indirectly supported the view taken by the UNHCR that protection should be given irrespective of whether the lack of national protection against persecution can be attributed to a positive intention to harm on the part of the State. But the principle that agents of persecution may either be public officials or private individuals, provided the risk is real and State authorities are unable to provide protection or alleviate the risk, was held only in H.L.R. v. France (supra n.88, at para.40). And this principle was enlarged, in D. v. United Kingdom (supra n.5, at para.49) to cases where the risk of ill-treatment emanating from the public authority or private group is not even intentionally inflicted, and "cannot therefore engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities of that country". 100. The requirement for "substantial grounds" means that expulsion, extradition or deportation per se do not in normal circumstances amount to ill-treatment or punishment; there need to be "certain circumstances" for Art3 of the European Convention, Art.7 of the Political Covenant, or Art.3 of the Torture Covenant to become relevant.
101. The point of time to assess the risk is the situation when refoulement is taking place.
standard of proof is set extremely high under the European Convention and the Political Covenant. The importance given to the "right sort" of evidence by the Strasbourg organs and the Human Rights Committee makes the gathering of information a crucial element. 102 In addition, it is for the asylum-seeker to show "substantial grounds" and "real risk". 103 In contrast, the standard of proof seems much lower under the Torture Convention since the existence of mass violation of human rights in the country of origin may expressly be relied upon. The practice of European States in giving asylum-seekers temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds relies on similar assessments of generalised violations of human rights. Moreover, European States recognise that the burden of proof is shared between the asylum-seeker and the competent authorities. The Torture Convention is silent on who has to show "substantial grounds".
In proving a "well-founded fear" of persecution, European States generally require that sufficient facts be provided by the asylum-seeker to enable the competent national authority to conclude one way or another that, if returned to his or her country of origin, the asylum-seeker would face a serious risk of harm. 104 While the facts relied upon by the asylum-seeker must be proved on a balance of probability, 105 in some States the legal test for the risk is set lower. For instance, in assessing the "risk" element, the Swiss and German courts require a "considerable probability" that the asylum-seeker will be persecuted if returned.
106 This is not the case in the United Kingdom, where the House of Lords requires 10Z This is often an impossible task to do without recourse to NGOs. The role of NGOs in this respect could be emphasised and formalised.
103. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee has come to recognise that the burden of proof does not rest alone on the author of the application but, rather, that it must be shared between the author and the State against which the application is brought. See McGoldrick, op. ds. supra n.ll, at p.149.
104. See Goodwin-Gill, op. cil supra n.ll, at pp349-352. 105. The facts put forward by the asylum-seeker in his or her testimony should describe a truthful set of events (e.g. torture, detention or discrimination) and establish a credible link between these events and himself or herself as an individual. In the UK the Court of Appeal, while deciding that a fraudulent claim based on false facts may not deprive an asylum-seeker from the protection of the Refugee Convention, nevertheless recognised that the asylum-seeker would be devoid of any credibility and would therefore be unlikely to prove to the required standard a genuine subjective fear of persecution: M. 106. This is quite a restrictive test because, according to this standard, a fact is proved only if its existence is "more likely than not". So, persecution would be relevant only if the chances that it will take place are larger than 50%. See R. a "reasonable degree of likelihood". 107 As for Sweden, in spite of a reference to "reasonable grounds" in the legislation, the procedure has been questioned by both the European Commission and the Torture Committee for failing to apply the test to assess evidence provided in the law. 108 While the burden of proof in principle lies on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate information on the human rights situation in the country of origin is shared between the applicant and the examiner. 109 As a result of considerable difficulties faced by asylumseekers and national authorities in obtaining reliable circumstantial evidence on countries of origin, two documentation centres, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre (IRBDC) and the UNHCR's Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR), have been established. Their task is to gather and make available information from various sources (i.e. newspapers, broadcast reports, governmental and non-governmental agencies' reports, or embassies in countries of origin reports), and to corroborate it where possible. This is in response to recognition of credibility and truthworthiness of information as being "the essential foundation for good decisions". 110 Finally, European States have interpreted the Refugee Convention to preclude refugee status to applicants who cannot be "singled out" as individuals. The asylum-seeker may still be granted protection against refoulement on humanitarian grounds, where he or she is a member of a group against whom there exists a pattern of persecution.
1 " Similar subsidiary protection may equally be granted where no conclusive evidence on the facts is found yet the asylum-seeker has a credible fear of persecution.
112 This is in compliance with UNHCR guidelines that asylum-seekers must be given the benefit of the doubt.
The European Court of Human Rights has recently recognised the relevance of Article 3 of the European Convention to the expulsion of asylum-seekers "whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State". 113 The 12 * In assessing the existence of "substantial grounds" in cases of expulsion, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights consider whether reasonable grounds exist that expulsion is going to take place. 123 In particular, it will look at whether the applicant is going to be expelled for certain and 112. In the UK the asylum-seeker will be granted exceptional leave to remain. This is a decision taken by the Home Office outside the immigration rules. See, in particular, the Secretary of State's public policy statement that "We use exceptional leave to remain to respond to cases that are outside the [ In Soering the Court concluded that "the likelihood of the feared exposure of the applicant to the 'death row phenomenon' has been shown to be such as to bring Article 3 into play" (supra n.6, at para.99). In Vilvarajah the Court held that "A mere possibility of ill-treatment, however, in such circumstances [i.e. the personal position of the applicants was not any worse than the generality of other members of the Tamil community] is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3" (supra n.97, at para.lll).
imminently, 124 and at whether the country to which the applicant is to be expelled may subject this person to such treatment. The Court requires that the individual be singled out from a situation of general violence.' 25 Once reasonable grounds that expulsion is going to take place have been found the element of "real risk" can be assessed. The Court recognises a "real risk" when "the foreseeable consequences" of the State party's decision to extradite (expel or deport) is that the applicant will be subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the requesting country. 126 In assessing such foreseeability, the Court takes various considerations into account (e.g. the general and special circumstances of each individual case, the relevant national legislation and practice relating to expulsion, the situation in the country of destination, in particular the current probability of torture, persecution, inhuman or degrading treatment, according to the reports and conclusions of investigations carried out by the national authorities, the United Nations and even sometimes certain non-governmental organisations). In this regard, the Soering case was quite simple "because the ill-treatment which Mr Soering risked was going to be administered by the State of Virginia in accordance with its law". IZ7 In less clear cases, a high degree of proof is required. For instance, in the Chahal case, the defence team gathered an unprecedented amount of evidence, including a report by Amnesty International showing that the Punjab police were exercising activities violating human rights inside as well as outside their jurisdiction, and a violation of Article 3 was found. 128 However, the Court did not find a violation of Article 3 in H.L.R. v. France, despite the similarities between these two cases. 129 And, in the Ahmed case, a key factor for the Court in finding that the risk was serious was the recognition of the applicant as a refugee by the Home Secretary, in 1992. Thus, H.L. R. v. France, and also Cruz Varas v. Sweden, demonstrate the importance of evidence, particularly when submitting a non-governmental organisations. 117 As a result, the Committee found that extradition to face execution by gas asphyxiation amounted to a violation of Article 7 in only one case, Ng v. Canada. m The principle that expulsion to a country could constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Torture Convention was first recognised in 1994, in Mutombo v. Switzerland, whenever "there are substantial grounds for believing that [the applicant] would be in danger of being subjected to torture", and torture was found to be the "foreseeable and necessary consequence" of expulsion on account of all relevant considerations, including the general situation in Zaire, which was found to be one of mass violation of human rights." 9 This case further reveals that the author of a communication must show that the risk or danger of being subjected to torture concerns him or her personally. 140 Expulsion, in the event that it would take place, was again found to constitute a violation of Article 3 in, for instance, Alan v. Switzerland}in the author's presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of the author's claims". 1 ' 18 VII. CONCLUSION STATES have a legal obligation to prevent the refoulement of refugees and asylum-seekers; they must implement their duty in good faith through the establishment of effective procedures for the determination of refugee status. However, refugee law is limited to asylum-seekers and refugees seeking protection with "clean hands". Hence the need to look for protection against refoulement under human rights law. With the exception of rejected asylum-seekers in Andorra, Albania and the United Kingdom, who may seek protection only under the European Convention, asylum-seekers in Europe may alternatively choose to start proceedings before one of the two UN Committees. The similarities between these proceedings make it difficult to identify one clear winner among the three instruments. However, this article reveals some discrepancies which are worth taking into account before considering submitting a petition.
The Political Covenant stands out as the least suitable instrument. Indeed, views of the Human Rights Committee in extradition cases reveal no more than a restrictive application of the principles developed by the Strasbourg organs. The shorter length of proceedings and the simplicity of the views of this Committee may certainly count as an advantage but this does not compensate for the restrictive use of evidence by the Committee. In the long run, however, it is not excluded that the Committee may gradually incorporate the principles held by the Strasbourg organs but, as things stand, reliance on the European Convention or the Torture Convention seems to constitute a safer option. Both the Strasbourg organs and the Torture Committee can claim a proven record of successful applications and yet so many features distinguish one from another. Among the factors playing in favour of petitioning the Torture Committee, one may find the short length of proceedings, the absence of a time limit for making a petition, and the almost total lack of formalism with regard to making an application and with regard to the Committee's views. Furthermore, the Torture Committee applies relaxed evidentiary requirements. However, the Torture Convention limits the scope of non-refoulement to cases of torture. In contrast, non-refoulement under the European Convention extends to inhuman and degrading treatment, whatever the source, but admissibility requirements are stringent and every single one is strictly applied. In sum, the best option lies in proceedings before the Strasbourg organs, provided particular effort is 158. Alan, supra n.131, at para. 113, Kisoki,supra n.\42, at para 9.3, and Tola,supra n. 143, at para.103. Express reference was made in particular to paras.198-199 of the UNHCR Handbook.
